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بررسی سازوکارهای مقابله با تصاحب خصمانه در حقوق انگلیس و امکان سنجی آن ها در حقوق ایران | ||
| پژوهشنامه حقوق تطبیقی | ||
| مقاله 2، دوره 8، شماره 3 - شماره پیاپی 15، مهر 1403، صفحه 27-51 اصل مقاله (476.95 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22080/lps.2023.25453.1520 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| محمد حسن بادینلو1؛ حبیب اله رمضانی آکردی* 2 | ||
| 1کارشناس ارشد حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده علوم اجتماعی، دانشگاه بین المللی امام خمینی (ره)، قزوین، ایران. | ||
| 2استادیار گروه حقوق، دانشکده علوم اجتماعی، دانشگاه بین المللی امام خمینی (ره)، قزوین، ایران. | ||
| تاریخ دریافت: 10 خرداد 1402، تاریخ بازنگری: 07 شهریور 1402، تاریخ پذیرش: 21 مهر 1402 | ||
| چکیده | ||
| «تصاحب» شرکتهای تجاری به عنوان یک نهاد حقوقی مستقل از «ادغام»، یعنی به دست آوردن کنترل مدیریتی شرکتهای دیگر (شرکت هدف) توسط یک فرد یا شخص (شرکت پیشنهاددهنده یا تصاحب کننده)، از طریق خرید دارایی های اصلی یا اکتساب اکثریت سهام دارای حق رأی در انتخاب مدیران (سهام کنترلی در شرکت های سهامی عام). این نهاد حقوقی یک استراتژی با انگیزه هایی نظیر ایجاد انحصار در بازار، کسب قدرت برتر، اشتراک مساعی و همافزایی و... بوده که با عنایت به ماهیت آن، بیشتر به صورت تصاحب خصمانه یک شرکت هدف توسط شرکت تصاحب کننده و بدون رضایت هیأت مدیره شرکت هدف به وقوع می پیوندد. در این میان، هیأت مدیره شرکت هدف برای مقاومت در برابر تصاحب خصمانه معمولا متوسل به یک سری اقدامات میگردد تا از تصاحب شرکت متبوع خود جلوگیری نماید که از این تدابیر به عنوان سازوکارها یا دفاعهای مقابله با تصاحب خصمانه یاد میشود. در این مقاله سعی میشود دفاع های مزبور در حقوق انگلیس معرفی و موضع قانونگذار ایران با روش توصیفی-تحلیلی و با نگاه تطبیقی مورد بررسی قرار گیرد. لذا بنا بر نتایج به دست آمده از این پژوهش و با عنایت به قوانین حقوقی متمایز، لزوما امکان بکارگیری تدابیر دفاعی ارائه شده در حقوق انگلیس در حقوق ایران میسر نمیباشد. مضافا با توجه به خلا قانونگذاری صریح و مبسوط در حقوق ایران در رابطه با نهاد تصاحب، اولا لزوم و نیاز به تدوین قوانین و مقررات مختصِ نهاد تصاحب (مستقل از ادغام) در حقوق کشورمان احساس میگردد. ثانیا در زمان فرآیند تصاحب خصمانه و بکارگیری سازوکارهای دفاعی در مقابل آن، سهامداران شرکتهای ایرانی (به طور ویژه شرکتهای سهامی عام) نیازمند حمایتهای صریح تر قانونگذار در برابر تصمیمات هیأت مدیره میباشند تا سودجویی یا بلندپروازی های مدیران شرکتها در فرآیند تصاحب موجب افت ارزش سهام یا تضییع سایر حقوق سهامداران شرکت تصاحبکننده یا شرکت هدف نگردد. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| تصاحب؛ ادغام؛ تصاحب خصمانه؛ دفاع قبل از پیشنهاد؛ دفاع پس از پیشنهاد | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Study about the mechanisms of confrontation with hostile takeover in English Law and their Feasibility in Iranian Law | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Mohamad Hassan Badinloo1؛ Habibollah Ramezani Akerdi2 | ||
| 1M.A in Private Law, Faculty of Social Sciences, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran. | ||
| 2Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Faculty of Social Sciences, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| “take over" of business companies as a legal entity independent of "merger", is the acquisition of management control of other companies (the target company) by an individual or organ (the offeror or the acquirer company) through the purchase of the main assets or acquisition of the majority of voting shares in the election of directors (controlling shares in public companies). This legal entity has been a strategy with motives such as creating a monopoly in the market, gaining superior power, synergy, etc., which, considering its nature, is mostly in the form of a hostile Takeover of a target company by the acquiring company without the consent of the board of directors of the target company. In the meantime, the board of directors of the target company usually resorts to a series of measures to prevent the takeover of its company, which are referred to as mechanisms or defenses against hostile takeover. In this article, it is tried to introduce the aforementioned defenses in English law and examine the position of the Iranian legislator with a descriptive-analytical method and with a comparative perspective. Therefore, according to the results and considering different laws, it is not necessarily possible to apply the defense provided in English law in Iranian law. In addition, due to the lack of explicit and extensive legislation in Iranian law regarding the takeover entity, first of all, the necessity and need to formulate rules and regulations specific to the Takeover entity is felt in the laws of our country. Secondly, during the process of hostile takeover and the use of defense mechanisms against it, the shareholders of Iranian companies need more explicit support from the legislator against the decisions of the board of directors rather than profit seeking or ambitions of company managers in the process. takeover should not cause a drop in the value of the shares or damage other rights of the shareholders of the acquiring company or the target company. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Takeover, Merger, Hostile Takeover, pre-bid Defenses, post-bid Defenses | ||
| مراجع | ||
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