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دستیابی به تعادل نش و استاکلبرگ در یک بازی استراتژیک بین دولت و بانک مرکزی با فرض وجود نااطمینانی مقام مالی در دستیابی به بودجه | ||
| پژوهشنامه اقتصاد کلان Macroeconomics Research Letter | ||
| مقاله 1، دوره 18، شماره 40، اسفند 1402، صفحه 7-39 اصل مقاله (1.18 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: علمی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22080/iejm.2024.26710.2044 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| داود محمودی نیا* 1؛ داود فروتن نیا2 | ||
| 1دانشیار گروه اقتصاد دانشگاه ولی عصر(عج) رفسنجان | ||
| 2عضو هیات علمی گروه ریاضی دانشگاه ولی عصر (عج) رفسنجان | ||
| تاریخ دریافت: 16 بهمن 1402، تاریخ بازنگری: 29 بهمن 1402، تاریخ پذیرش: 30 بهمن 1402 | ||
| چکیده | ||
| هدف این مقاله بررسی تعامل رفتار بین دو بازیکن مهم در اقتصاد یعنی دولت و بانک مرکزی با وجود عدم اطمینان دولت در دستیابی به سطح مشخصی از بودجه می‌باشد. هدف دولت رسیدن به بالاترین رشد اقتصاد با کمک ابزار بودجه‌ای و هدف بانک مرکزی نیز ثبات قیمت‌ها با استفاده از ابزار سیاستی نرخ بهره است. از این رو بازی بین دو مقام پولی و مالی در چارچوب بازی غیرهمکارانه و بازی رهبر- پیرو (استاکلبرگ) مورد تجزیه و تحلیل قرار گرفت. برای این منظور ابتدا از طریق توابع زیان و قیود برای دو سیاست‌گذار و حل آن، توابع بهترین پاسخ و تعادل نش و تعادل استاکلبرگ استخراج شد و سپس بر اساس پارامترهای موجود در اقتصاد ایران شبیه‌سازی صورت گرفت. نتایج این تحقیق نشان می‌دهد که پاسخ دولت به افزایش نرخ بهره سیاستی، انبساطی و پاسخ بانک مرکزی نیز به افزایش کسری بودجه دولت انبساطی می-باشد. از طرف دیگر در تعادل نش افزایش متغیر نااطمینانی دولت سبب افزایش در تابع زیان دولت و بانک مرکزی می‌شود. دیگر نتایج این تحقیق نشان می‌دهد که پیامد حاصل از بازی غیرهمکارانه بسیار نزدیک به زمانی است که دولت به عنوان رهبر و بانک مرکزی به عنوان پیرو عمل می‌کند و در این وضعیت تابع زیان اجتماعی پایین‌تر می‌باشد. همچنین تغییر در وزن نسبت داده شده به تورم توسط مقام مالی در تابع قید سبب کاهش ابزار سیاستی دولت در تعادل نش می‌شود. از این رو به هر دو سیاست پیشنهاد می‌گردد که همواره در ارائه بسته سیاستی خود وزن قابل توجهی در تابع زیان خود به نرخ تورم دهند و سعی شود در صورت استقلال دو سیاست‌گذار بازی را ارائه دهند که در آن دولت نقش رهبر و بانک مرکزی نقش پیرو را ایفا نماید. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| تعادل نش؛ تعادل استاکلبرگ؛ سیاست‌های پولی؛ سیاست‌های مالی؛ بودجه دولت؛ عدم اطمینان | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Achieving the Nash and Stackelberg Equilibrium in a Strategic Game between the Government and the Central Bank, Assuming the Uncertainty of the Financial Authority in Obtaining the Budget | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Davoud Mahmoudinia1؛ Davoud Foroutannia2 | ||
| 1Department of Economics, Vali-e-Asr University of Rafsanjan, Iran | ||
| 2Department of Mathematics, Vali-e-Asr University of Rafsanjan, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| The purpose of this study is to investigate the interaction of behavior between two important players in the economy, namely the government and the central bank, despite the uncertainty of the government in achieving a certain level of budget. The goal of the government is to achieve the highest growth of the economy with the help of budgetary tools, and the goal of the central bank is to stabilize prices using the policy tool of interest rates. The existence of independence between two authorities was analyzed in the framework of two non-cooperative games and the leader-follower game (Stackelberg) based on the existing parameters in Iran's economy. The results of this research show that both the government's response to the increase in the political interest rate and the central bank's response to the increase in the government's budget deficit are expansionary. On the other hand, in the Nash equilibrium, an increase in the uncertainty variable of the government causes an increase in the loss function of the government and the central bank. Moreover, the change in the weight attributed to inflation by the financial authority in the constraint function causes the government's policy instrument to decrease in the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, it is recommended for both policies to always give significant weight to the inflation rate in their loss function in presenting their policy package and try to present a game in the case of independence of two politicians, in which the government plays the role of the leader and the central bank should play the role of follower. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium, monetary policies, financial policies, government budget, uncertainty | ||
| مراجع | ||
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